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Models on private provision of public goods typically involve a single
private good and linear production technology for the public good. We
study a model with several private goods and non-linear (strictly con-
cave) production technology. We revisit the question of “neutrality” of
government interventions on equilibrium outcomes and show that relative
price eﬀects that are absent with a single private good and linear pro-
duction technology become a powerful channel of redistribution in this
case. Contrary to previous results, redistributing endowments in favor of
contributors is shown to be neither necessary nor suﬃcient for increasing
the equilibrium level of public good.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we analyze a general equilibrium model of a completely decen-
tralized pure public good economy. Competitive firms using private goods as
inputs produce the public good, which is “financed”, or “privately provided”, or
“voluntarily contributed”, by households. Previous studies on private provision
of public goods typically use one private good, one public good models in which
the public good is produced through a constant returns to scale technology. Two
distinguishing features of our model are the presence of several private goods
and non-linear, in fact strictly concave, production technology for the public
good. In this more general framework we revisit the question of “neutrality” of
government interventions on private provision equilibrium outcomes. We show
that relative price eﬀects, which are absent with a single private good and under
constant returns to scale technology for public good production, come to play
an important role in our more general framework. Relative price eﬀects provide
a powerful channel through which government interventions can bring about
redistributive wealth eﬀects, which, in turn, will change equilibrium outcomes.
Warr (1983) provides the first statement of the fact that in a private provision
model of voluntary public good supply, small income redistributions among con-
tributors to a public good are “neutralized” by changes in amounts contributed
in equilibrium. Consumption of the private good and the total supply of the
public good remain exactly the same as before redistribution.
Bernheim (1986) and Andreoni (1988) extend Warr’s result to show that
distortionary taxes and subsidies may also be neutralized by changes in private
contributions. Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) - from now on quoted as
BBV - discuss Warr’s results in a simple general equilibrium model with one
private and one public good and constant returns to scale in the production of
the public good.
BBV show that redistribution is neutral if the amount of income distributed
away from any household is less than his private contribution to the public
good in the original equilibrium. They also show that changes in the wealth
distribution which are small enough to leave unchanged the set of contributing
households have the following properties: (i) leaving unchanged the aggregate
wealth of current contributors will leave unchanged the equilibrium level of the
public good; (ii) increasing the aggregate wealth of current contributors will
increase the level of public good.
In our model, we do confirm that the neutrality result of BBV stated above
holds true for “small” lump-sum taxes on contributing households. On the other
hand, we show that their results on (i) and (ii) above do not hold in a more
general setup such as ours.
Observe that in the BBV setup, where there is only one private good and
relative price changes are ruled out by assumption, a redistribution (using the
only private good which is by default the numeraire good) in favor of a consumer
automatically implies that her wealth increases. But with more than one private
good and relative price changes allowed, a positive subsidy in terms of the
numeraire good does not necessarily imply that the consumer’s overall wealth
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will increase. The reason behind this is the role relative price changes play: in
the equilibrium after redistribution, changes in overall prices may (more than)
oﬀset the increase in the numeraire good due to the subsidy. Therefore, the
expressions “subsidize household h (with the numeraire good)” and “increase the
wealth of household h (in the equilibrium after redistribution)” are equivalent
in BBV’s model, but not in ours. Another consequence of allowing for relative
price changes is that a redistribution that involves a subset of households does
not only aﬀect the wealth of households in that subset. It also (indirectly)
aﬀects the wealth of households outside that subset through changes in relative
prices it gives rise to. Allowing for relative price changes is the main reason why
our results diﬀer from their counterparts by BBV.
We show that a) the level of public good can be changed without aﬀecting
contributors’ total wealth; b) a redistribution in favor of contributors, in either of
two meanings described above, is neither a necessary nor a suﬃcient condition to
increase the level of privately provided public good. For example, redistributing
the numeraire good among the non-contributors only may increase, or decrease,
or leave unchanged the public good level even though the set of contributing
agents remains the same in this case.
Our results highlight the crucial role of relative price changes that arise from
redistribution of wealth on voluntary contributions to a public good. Relative
price changes are simply ruled out in a model with one private good and linear
production technology for the public good.
The plan of our paper is as follows. In section 2, we present the set up of the
model and the existence and regularity results proved by Villanacci and Zengi-
nobuz (2005a). In Section 3, we state and prove our results on how government
intervention in the form of pure redistribution influences the total amount of
public good. In Section 4 we discuss our results and remark on the properties
of the model we studied.1
2 Setup of the Model
We consider a general equilibrium model with private provision of a public
good.2 There are C, C ≥ 1, private commodities, labelled by c = 1, 2, ..., C.
There are H households, H > 1, labelled by h = 1, 2, ...,H. Let H = {1, ...,H}
denote the set of households. Let xch denote consumption of private commodity
c by household h; ech embodies similar notation for the endowment in private
goods. The following notation is also used: x ≡ (xh)Hh=1 ∈ RCH++ , where xh ≡
(xch)
C
c=1;. e ≡ (eh)Hh=1 ∈ RCH++ , where eh ≡ (ech)Cc=1; p ≡ (pc)Cc=1, where pc is the
price of private good c; bp ≡ (p, pg), where pg is the price of the public good;
g ≡ (gh)Hh=1, where gh ∈ R+ is the amount of public good that consumer h
provides; G ≡
PH
h=1 gh and G\h ≡ G− gh.
1A more detailed version of the paper, containing even the most elementary proofs, is
available upon request from the authors.
2The presence of more than one public good can be incorporated into our model, leaving
the basic results unchanged.
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The preferences over the private goods and the public good of household
h are represented by a utility function uh : RC++ × R++ → R. Note that
households’ preferences are defined over the total amount of the public good,
i.e., we have uh : (xh, G) 7→ uh (xh,G).
Assumption 1 uh is a smooth, diﬀerentiably strictly increasing (i.e., for every
(xh, G) ∈ RC+1++ , Duh(xh, G) À 0)3 , diﬀerentiably strictly concave func-
tion (i.e., for every (xh, G) ∈ RC+1++ , D2uh(xh, G) is negative definite),
and for each u ∈ R the closure in the standard topology of RC+1 of the
set
©
(xh, G) ∈ RC+1++ : uh (xh, G) ≥ u
ª
is contained in RC+1++ .
There is a fixed number F of firms4, indexed by subscript f, that use a
production technology represented by a transformation function tf : RC+1 → R,
where tf :
³
yf , y
g
f
´
7→ tf
³
yf , y
g
f
´
.
Assumption 2 tf
³
yf , y
g
f
´
is a C2, diﬀerentiably strictly decreasing (i.e., Dtf
³
yf , y
g
f
´
¿
0), and diﬀerentiably strictly concave function, with tf (0) = 0.
For each f , define byf ≡ ³yf , ygf´, by ≡ (byf )Ff=1 and Yf ≡ ©byf ∈ RC+1 : tf (byf ) ≥ 0ª,
t ≡ (tf )Ff=1 and bp ≡ (p, pg).
The following assumption on the production set Y ≡
PF
f=1 Yf is made to
ensure existence of equilibria.
Assumption 2’ (Bounded reversibility) Y ∩ (−Y ) is bounded.
Using the convention that input components of the vector byf are negative
and output components are positive, the profit maximization problem for firm
f is: For given bp ∈ RC+1++ ,
Max
?y∈RC+1
bpby s.t. tf (by) ≥ 0 (1)
From Assumption 2, it follows that if problem (1) has a solution, it is unique
and it is characterized by Kuhn-Tucker (in fact, Lagrange) conditions.
Let sfh be the share of firm f owned by household h. sf ≡ (sfh)Hh=1 ∈ RH+
and s ≡ (sf )Ff=1 ∈ RFH+ . The set of all shares of each firm f is S ≡ {sf ∈
[0, 1]H :
PH
h=1 sfh = 1}. s ≡ (sf )Ff=1 ∈ SF . The set of shares sh ≡ (sfh)Ff=1 of
household h is [0, 1]F .
Note that sfh ∈ [0, 1] denotes the proportion of profits of firm f owned by
household h. The definition of S simply requires each firm to be completely
owned by some households.
3For vectors y, z, y ≥ z (resp. y À z) means every element of y is not smaller (resp.
strictly larger) than the correponding element of z; y > z means that y ≥ z but y 6= z.
4Thus, we assume there is no possibility of new entry of firms into the market.
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Household’s maximization problem is then the following: For given bp ∈
RC+1++ , sh ∈ [0, 1]
F , eh ∈ RC++, G\h ∈ R+, by ∈ R(C+1)F ,
Max
(xh,gh)∈RC++×R
uh
¡
xh, gh +G\h
¢
s.t. −p (xh − eh)− pggh + bpPFf=1 sfhbyf ≥ 0
gh ≥ 0
(2)
From Assumption 1, it follows that problem (2) has a unique solution char-
acterized by Kuhn-Tucker conditions.
The set of all utility functions of household h that satisfy Assumption 1
is denoted by Uh; the set of all transformation functions of firm f that satisfy
Assumption 2 is denoted by Tf . Moreover define U ≡ ×Hh=1Uh and T ≡ ×Ff=1Tf .
Assumption 3 U and T are endowed with the subspace topology of the C3
uniform convergence topology on compact sets5,6 .
Definition 1 An economy is a vector π ≡ (e, s, u, t) ∈ Π ≡ RCH++ ×SF ×U × T .
Observe that the market clearing condition for one good, say good C, is
redundant. Moreover, the price of that good can be normalized without aﬀecting
the budget constraints of any household. With little abuse of notation, we
denote the normalized private and public good prices with p ≡
¡
p\, 1
¢
and pg,
respectively.
We are now able to give the following definition:
Definition 2 A vector (x, g, p\, pg, by) is an equilibrium for an economy π ∈ Π
if:
1. firms maximize, i.e., for each f , byf solves problem (1) at bp ∈ RC+1++ ;
2. households maximize, i.e., for each h , (xh, gh) solves problem (2) at p\ ∈
RC−1++ , pg ∈ R++, eh ∈ RC++, G\h ∈ R+, sh ∈ [0, 1]
F , by ∈ R(C+1)F ; and
3. markets clear , i.e., (x, g, by) solves
−
PH
h=1 x
\
h +
PH
h=1 e
\
h +
PF
f=1 y
\
f = 0
−
PH
h=1 gh +
PF
f=1 y
g
f = 0
(3)
where for each h and f , x\h ≡ (xch)c6=C , e
\
h ≡ (ech)c6=C ∈ R
C−1
++ and y
\
f ≡³
ycf
´
c 6=C
∈ RC−1.
5A sequence of functions fn whose domain is an open set O of Rm converges to f if and
only if fn, Dfn, D2fnand D3fn uniformly converge to f , Df , D2f and D3f respectively,
on any compact subset of O.
6 In the proof of existence of equilibria the fact that utility and transformation functions are
C2 suﬃces. We need the stronger form presented in Assumption 3 to apply the Transversality
Theorem to a function whose components contain the Hessian of utility and transformation
functions.
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By definition of uh, observe that we must have
P
h gh > 0 and, therefore (i)
since gh ≥ 0 for all h, there exists h0 such that gh0 > 0; and (ii)
PF
f=1 y
g
f > 0.
That is, there will exist at least one contributor to the public good and, hence,
there will be a strictly positive level of public good production. Note household
h is called a contributor if gh > 0, and a non-contributor if gh = 0.
Given our assumptions, we can now characterize equilibria in terms of the
system of Kuhn-Tucker conditions to problems (1) and (2), and market clearing
conditions (3).
Define
ξ ≡
³by, α, x, g, µ, λ, p\, pg´ ∈ Ξ ≡ R(C+1)F×¡−RF++¢×RCH++×RH×RH×RH++×RC−1++ ×R++
and
F : Ξ×Π→ RdimΞ, F : (ξ, π) 7→ left hand side of (4) below
...bp+ αfDtf (byf ) = 0
tf (byf ) = 0
..
Dxhuh
¡
xh, gh +G\h
¢
− λhp = 0
Dghuh
¡
xh, gh +G\h
¢
− λhpg + µh = 0
min {gh, µh} = 0
−p (xh − eh)− pggh + bpPFf=1 sfhbyf = 0
..
−
PH
h=1 x
\
h +
PH
h=1 e
\
h +
PF
f=1 y
\
f = 0
−
PH
h=1 gh +
PF
f=1 y
g
f = 0
(4)
where αf and λh, µh are the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers associated to the firm and
the household’s maximization problems.
Observe that
¡by, x, g, p\, pg¢ is an equilibrium associated with an economy
π if and only if there exists (α, µ, λ) such that F ¡by, α, x, g, µ, λ, p\, pg, π¢ = 0.
With innocuous abuse of terminology, we will call ξ ≡
¡by, α, x, g, µ, λ, p\, pg¢ an
equilibrium.
Using a homotopy argument applied to the above function, Villanacci and
Zenginobuz (2005a) prove existence of equilibria.7
Theorem 3 For every economy (e, s, u, t) ∈ RCH++ ×SF ×U ×T , an equilibrium
exists.
Villanacci and Zenginobuz (2005a) also show that there is a large set of the
endowments (the so-called regular economies) for which associated equilibria are
7 In fact, weaker assumptions on the utility and transformation functions than the ones
made in this paper suﬃce to prove existence and generic regularity of equilibria. However, to
prove the comparative statics results of this paper we need the stronger assumptions presented
in Assumption 1 and Assumption 2. For an account of these and other technical remarks we
make in this paper about existence and generic regularity of equilibria, see Villanacci and
Zenginobuz (2005a).
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finite in number, and that equilibria change smoothly with respect to endow-
ments. Theorem 4 below summarizes their generic regularity results. To this
end, the set of utility functions need to be restricted to a “large and reasonable”
subset eU of U :
Assumption 4 For all h, xh ∈ RC++ and G ∈ R++, it is the case that
det
∙
Dxhxhuh (xh, G) [Dxhuh (xh, G)]
T
DGxhuh (xh, G) DGuh (xh, G)
¸
6= 0. (5)
Let eUh be the subset of Uh satisfying Assumption 4 and define eU ≡ ×Hh=1 eUh
and eΠ ≡ RCH++ × SF × eU × T .
Assumption 4 has an easy and appealing economic interpretation. It is easy
to see that it is equivalent to the public good being a normal good, as long as
the household is a contributor.
Define
pr
(s,u,t) :
¡F
(s,u,t)
¢−1
(0)→ RCH++ , pr(s,u,t) : (ξ, e) 7→ e,
that is, pr
(s,u,t) is the projection of the equilibrium manifold onto the endowment
space. We then have the following result:
Theorem 4 For each (s, u, t) ∈ SF × eU × T , there exists an open and full
measure subset R∗ of RCH++ such that ∀e ∈ R∗
1. there exists r ∈ N such that F−1(s,u,t,e) (0) =
©
ξi ≡
¡byi, αi, xi, gi, µi, λi, p\i, pgi¢ªr
i=1
;
moreover, there exist an open neighborhood Y of e in RCH++ , and for each i
an open neighborhood Ui of
¡
ξi, e
¢
in
¡F
(s,u,t)
¢−1
(0), such that Uj∩Uk = ∅
if j 6= k, ¡pr
(s,u,t)
¢−1
(Y ) = ∪ri=1Ui and pr(s,u,t)|Ui : Ui → Y is a diﬀeo-
morphism.
2. ∀i and ∀h, either gih > 0 or µih > 0.8
The Theorem says that typically - i.e., for almost all the economies - (i)
the number of equilibria are finite and, locally, equilibrium variables depends
smoothly from the endowments; (ii) no household h is at the “border line case”
gh = 0 and µh = 0, and therefore, by continuity, small enough changes in
endowments do not change the set of contributors.
As indicated by the existence and regularity results we just cited, as well as
the setup of our model, we use diﬀerential techniques in our analysis. In terms
of demonstrating the main results of this paper, this amounts to computing
the derivative of the equilibrium values of the “goal function” - e.g., the total
amount of provided public good or household welfare levels - with respect to
some policy tools - e.g., redistributive lump-sum taxes or transfers.9 We describe
8The proof of the Theorem is contained in Villanacci and Zenginobuz (2005a).
9Note that all our arguments will therefore be “local” in their nature.
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in some detail the general strategy we use to prove our main results in the proof
of Theorem 810.
3 Redistribution ofWealth and Quantity of Pub-
lic Good
In this Section, we show the following results.
1. For all economies, “local redistributions”11 of endowments of a private
good among contributors do not change the set of equilibria.
2. For a generic, i.e., open and dense, subset of the economies for which there
exists at least one non-contributor, there exists a redistribution of endowments
of a private good between contributors and non-contributors which increases the
level of public good provided;
3. For a generic subset of economies for which there exist at least two non-
contributors, there exists a redistribution of the endowments of a private good
among contributors and non-contributors such that regardless of whether the
contributors have more, or less, or the same amount of the private good after
redistribution (or, alternatively, regardless of whether their wealth is increased,
or decreased, or remain unchanged) the level of public good provided may be
increased, or decreased, or left unchanged in a manner completely unrelated to
the change in the endowments (or wealth) of contributors.
Note that the last result covers the case where redistribution of endowments
involves only the non-contributors, with no change in the endowments or wealth
of contributors.
3.1 Redistributions among Contributors
The following theorem is a restatement of a theorem by BBV for the case of
many private goods, and its proof is a straight forward adaptation of their proof.
Theorem 5 Consider an equilibrium associated with an arbitrary economy and
a redistribution of the private numeraire good among contributing households
such that no household loses more wealth than her original contribution. All
the equilibria after the redistribution are such that the consumption of private
goods and the total amount of consumed public good are the same as before the
redistribution.
The basic intuition behind Theorem 5 is that if, in an equilibrium after
the redistribution, each household h expects that in the new equilibrium (i) all
prices stay the same; (ii) level of production of private and public goods stay
the same; and (iii) each other household h0 6= h changes her contribution by the
10For more detailed descriptions of the techniques and strategies of proof we use, also see
the papers by Cass and Citanna (1998), and Citanna, Kajii and Villanacci (1998).
11By ”local redistribution” we mean redistribution in an arbitray small neighborhood of a
given endowment.
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exact amount of the change in her wealth, then it will be optimal for household
h to change her contribution by the exact amount of the change in her own
wealth, leading to overall level of public good remaining the same as before the
redistribution.
As a simple Corollary to Theorem 5, we get the following:
Proposition 6 The set of equilibria after a local redistribution from an arbi-
trary set of non-contributors to one contributor is equal to the set of equilibria
after a local redistribution from that same arbitrary set of non-contributors to
an arbitrary set of contributors.
This result follows from the fact that each equilibrium with only 1 contrib-
utor being subsidized can be obtained from each equilibrium with more than
one contributor being subsidized using appropriate redistributions among con-
tributors. Making use of this result, we consider lump-sum taxes or transfers
on only one contributor in all of the diﬀerent types of planner interventions we
study below.
As we have already stated, the basic diﬀerence between BBV’s model and
ours is the importance of relative prices, which arise due to the presence of more
than one private good. To further clarify the role of relative prices, using BBV’s
transformation of the consumers’ problem we can rewrite the demand function
for the public good for a contributing household in our case as
gh : RC++ ×R2++ → R, gh :
¡
p, pg, wh +G\h
¢ 7→ gh ¡p, pg, wh +G\h¢ .
BBV’s Fact 2 (see page 34 of BBV) says that in equilibrium, there exists a
function B (G,H+), where H+ is the set of contributors, which is diﬀerentiable
and increasing in G and such that B (G,H+) =PHh=1wh. In fact, it turns out
that
B
¡
G,H+¢ =X
h∈C
Ψh (G) +
¡
1−#H+¢G
where Ψh (·) is an increasing function of G. Since the above equation holds
in equilibrium, BBV’s statements in Fact 2 are true as long as a change in
G does not change H+. In fact, what BBV does amounts to computing the
total derivative of B (·) with respect to G in equilibrium. In other words, they
analyze how a small change in G changes the function B (·) when Gmoves in the
equilibrium set. Clearly, if G changes, some other endogenous variable will in
general change in equilibrium. In their case the only other relevant endogenous
variable is H+. But in our case, following the same procedure as theirs, the
function B (·) is
B
¡
G,H+, p, pg¢ =X
h∈C
Ψh (G, p, p
g) +
¡
1−#H+¢G
and, in general, changing G in the equilibrium set will change the values of
prices, too. Therefore, the total derivative of B (·) with respect to G will have
to contain partial derivatives with respect to prices. In fact, since we deal with
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”small” redistributions of income the contributing set H+ (generically) does not
change in our case, and the only channel through which changes in the overall
public good level occur is the relative prices.12
3.2 Redistributions between Contributors and Non-contributors
We now look at the case in which the planner redistributes endowments of one
private good between a (strictly) contributing household, say h = 1, and one or
two (strictly) non-contributing household, say h = 2, 4.
First, the reader can check that the set of economies for which there exists
at least one or two non-contributors is open (and non-empty).13 The following
theorem covers the case where redistribution involves at least one contributor
and one non-contributor to the public good.
Theorem 7 For an open and dense subset S∗1 of the set Π
0 of the economies for
which there exists at least one non-contributor, there exists a redistribution of the
endowments of private good C between one contributor and one non-contributor
which increases (or decreases) the equilibrium level of provided public good.
We omit the proof of Theorem 7 since it is similar to that of Theorem 8,
which is provided in detail below.
Theorem 7 generalizes to our framework the similar non-neutrality result by
BBV - see their Theorem 4, part (ii)) - where they show that a redistribution
of income from non-contributors to contributors will aﬀect the level of public
good.
The main result of our paper which is presented below looks at the case
where there is redistribution from contributors to non-contributors as well as
the case where redistribution takes place only among non-contributors.
Theorem 8 Assume that C ≥ 2, and let Π00be the set of the economies for
which there exist at least two non-contributors. There exist open and dense
subsets S∗2 and S
∗
3 of Π
00with the following properties:
a. For any economy in S∗2 and any equilibrium associated with it, there exists
a redistribution of the endowments of a numeraire good among one contributor
and two non-contributors such that, regardless of whether the contributor is
given more, or less, or the same amount of the numeraire good, the level of
public good provided may be increased, or decreased, or left unchanged in a
manner completely unrelated to the change in the numeraire good endowment of
the contributor;
12Another point about BBV’s above result is that it amounts to showing that set of equilibria
before a local redistribution among contributors is a subset of the set of equilibria after a local
redistribution among contributors. In fact, the set inclusion in the opposite direction also
holds. This is so because an economy after a local redistribution is an economy suﬃciently
close to the starting one, and, with regularity, the number of equilibria is locally constant.
13The proof for openness is contained in the extended version of the paper, which is available
from authors upon request. (Non-emptiness follows from a Cobb-Douglas utility function
exercise.)
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b. For any economy in S∗3 and any equilibrium associated with it, there exists
a redistribution of the endowments of a numeraire good among one contributor
and two non-contributors such that regardless of whether the total wealth (in the
post -redistribution equilibrium) of the contributor is increased, or decreased, or
left constant, the level of public good provided may be increased, or decreased,
or left constant in a manner completely unrelated to the change in the wealth of
contributor.
A better understanding of Theorem 8can be gained reading the proof we
give below.
Proof of Theorem 8. First of all, we define a new equilibrium function
F1 (ξ, ρ, π), taking into account the impact of planner’s intervention on agents’
behaviors via the policy tools ρ ≡ (ρh)h=1,2,3 ∈ R3, where ρh denotes the lump-
sum tax, in terms of the numeraire good, imposed on household h; household 1
is assumed to be a contributor, and households 2 and 3 are non-contributors.
F1 : Ξ×R3 ×Π→ RdimΞ, F1 : (ξ, ρ, π) 7→ (Left Hand Side of (6) below)
bp+ αfDtf (byf ) = 0
tf (byf ) = 0
...
Dxhuh
¡
xh, gh +G\h
¢
− λhp = 0
Dghuh
¡
xh, gh +G\h
¢
− λhpg + µh = 0
min {gh, µh} = 0
−p (xh − eh) + ρh − pggh +
PF
f=1 sfhbpbyf = 0
...
−
PH
h=1 x
\
h +
PH
h=1 e
\
h +
PF
f=1 y
\
f = 0
−
PH
h=1 gh +
PF
f=1 y
g
f = 0
(6)
Observe that the only diﬀerence between the equilibrium system without planner
intervention, i.e. system(4), and the above system is the presence of the lump-
sum tax ρh in household h’s budget constraint.
We then introduce a function F2 (ξ, ρ, π), describing the constraints on the
planner intervention, i.e., the fact that the planner can only redistribute re-
sources among households:
F2 : Ξ×R3 ×Π→ R2, F2 : (ξ, ρ, π) 7→ ρ1 + ρ2 + ρ3
Zeros of the function eF ≡ (F1,F2) are “equilibria with planner’s intervention”.
We then partition the vector ρ of tools into two subvectors (ρ1, ρ2) ∈ R2 and
ρ3 ∈ R, where (ρ1, ρ2) can be interpreted as the vector of independent tools and
ρ3 as the value of the dependent tool: once the values of the first two tools is
chosen, the value of the third one is uniquely determined. Observe that there
exists (ρ1, ρ2) (and associated ρ3) at which equilibria with and without planner’s
intervention coincide: this value is simply zero.
We then define a goal function G (ξ, ρ, π). To fix ideas we can take the
goals as described in part a. of the Theorem: the level of lump-sum tax on the
12
contributor and the total provision of the public good. Therefore, we define
G : Ξ×R3 ×Π→ R, G : (ξ, ρ, π) 7→
³
ρ1,
PH
h=1 gh
´
We want to analyze the local eﬀect of a change in (ρ1, ρ2) around (ρ1, ρ2)
on G when its arguments assume their equilibrium (with planner intervention)
values.14 We proceed through the following more technical steps.
We show15 that for every (s, u, t) , there exists an open and full measure
subset Ω of RCH++ such that for every e ∈ Ω and for every ξ ∈ Ξ such thateF (ξ, (ρ1, ρ2) , ρ3, e, s, u, t) = 0, there exist an open neighborhood N of (ρ1, ρ2)
and a unique C1 function
h (ρ1, ρ2) ≡ (ξ (ρ1, ρ2) , ρ3 (ρ1, ρ2))
defined on N , such that
eF (ξ (ρ1, ρ2) , ρ3 (ρ1, ρ2) , (ρ1, ρ2) , π) = 0
The function h describes how equilibrium variables ξ and the dependent
tool ρ3 adjust to (small) changes in planner’s independent tools (ρ1, ρ2). In
particular the component gh (ρ1, ρ2) of ξ (ρ1, ρ2) says how the equilibrium-with-
planner-intervention value of gh reacts to the planner policy. Therefore the
function
g : N → R2, (ρ1, ρ2) 7→
Ã
ρ1,
HX
h=1
gh (ρ1, ρ2)
!
describes how the goal values change when the planner uses her policy tools and
variables move in the equilibrium set defined by eF .
The purpose of the analysis is to show that there exists an open and dense
subset S∗ ⊆ Π such that for each π ∈ S∗, the planner can “move” the equilib-
rium values of the goal function in any directions locally around g (ρ1, ρ2), the
value of the goal function in the case of no intervention.16 More explicitly, we
want to show that the function g has the following property.
Take an arbitrary pair of signs in the changes ∆ of the equilibrium-with-
planner-intervention values of ρ1 and
P
h gh, say ∆ρ1 = ρ1 > 0, i.e. a positive
lump-sum tax on the contributor, and ∆ (
P
h gh) > 0, i.e., an increase in the
level of provided public good.
14 If the goal of planner intervention is to potentially change the wealth of all contributors,
as in part b.of the Theorem, the first argument of the function G becomes
[
h∈H+
⎛
⎝peh +
F[
f=1
sfhepeyf
⎞
⎠+ ρ1
15That result is a consequence of the transversality theorem - see, for example, Hirsch
(1976), Theorem 2.7, page 79 - and of the fact that zero is a regular value for hF .
16 In other words, we want to show that for any direction of movement away from g (ρ1, ρ2)
and for any neighborhood N1 ⊆ N of (ρ1, ρ2), there exists a point

ρ∗1, ρ
∗
2

∈ N1 such that
g

ρ∗1, ρ
∗
2

belong to that direction.
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Then there exists a well chosen pair of values of ρ1 and of ρ2 that “induces
changes” in
P
h gh, besides ρ1 itself, of the desired signs.
The above describe property is what is sometimes called essential surjectivity,
which is defined as follows: g is essentially surjective at (ρ1, ρ2) if the image of
each open neighborhood of (ρ1, ρ2) contains an open neighborhood of g ((ρ1, ρ2))
in R2.
A suﬃcient condition for g to be essentially surjective is that17
rank
£
D(ρ1,ρ2)g((ρ1, ρ2))
¤
= 2 (7)
Verification of the above condition is straightforward but quite involved tech-
nically, and, therefore, it is omitted.18
In their theorem 4, BBV say that if we restrict the analysis to changes in
the wealth distribution that leave unchanged the set of contributors the follow-
ing result is true: Any change in the wealth distribution that leaves unchanged
(increase) the aggregate wealth of current contributors will leave unchanged (in-
crease) the equilibrium supply of the public good. As a consequence of Theorem
8, BBV’s statements do not hold true in our model. We noted in the Introduc-
tion that, unlike BBV’s one private good model, in our model with more than
one private good the expressions “redistributing the numerarie good in favor of
household h” and “increase the wealth of household h (in the equilibrium after
redistribution)” are not equivalent to each other. Parts a. and b. in Theorem
8, respectively, cover redistributions in the first and the latter senses. Trans-
fers of the numeraire good that involves only the non-contributors, without any
transfer to or from any of the contributors (or, without any change in their
wealth), can move G in any direction. Even transferring numeraire good from
a contributor or decreasing her wealth can move G in any direction.
The requirement C ≥ 2 in the theorem brings out the importance of having
more than one private good in obtaining non-neutrality results in our analysis.19
To see why having more than one private good is essential to aﬀect relative price
changes, consider the case of one public and one private good. Redistributing
the private good among non-contributors will not change the demand of the
public good because contributors are not aﬀected by this intervention and non-
contributors do not become contributors (because, generically, we are not on the
border line cases and taxes are small). Therefore, there will also be no change
in the overall demand for the single private good. With no other private good
available, the overall eﬀect is just a reallocation of the demand for the private
good from a non-contributor to another.
17See for example, Chapter 1 in Golubitsky and Guillemin (1973).
18 In fact, the diﬀerentiably strict concavity of both the utility and the transformation func-
tions, which implies that the associated Hessian matrices have full rank, is used to show that
the above mentioned rank condition holds.
19More technically, the condition on the number of goods is required in the proof of condition
(7).
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4 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
The interest in a general equilibrium model with private provision of public
goods lies in the fact that it serves as a benchmark extension of an analysis
of completely decentralized private good economies to public good economies.
Moreover, there are some relevant situations in which public goods are in fact
privately provided: e.g., private donations to charity at a national and interna-
tional level, campaign funds for political parties or special interests groups, and
certain economic activities inside a family.
With only one private good, assuming constant returns to scale, and there-
fore linearity of the production function, implies that profits of firms are equal
to zero, and the presence of firms basically plays no role in the model.
With more than one private good and non-constant returns to scale, model-
ing of how the public good is produced becomes an issue. If a profit-maximizing
(private) firm is assumed to produce the public good, then how the (non-zero)
profits of the firm are apportioned among its shareholders will have an impact
on equilibrium outcomes. Alternatively, one can consider the production of the
public good as being carried out by a non-profit (public) firm subject to a bal-
anced budget constraint. In that case the contributions in monetary amounts
collected from households would finance the cost of producing the public good.
The amount of public good to be produced by the non-profit firm can be taken
as the maximum amount that can be produced with the amount collected. 20
In the present paper, we studied the alternative that we believe is the one
most consistent with a decentralized framework, namely that profit-maximizing
firms produce the public good in a competitive market. Thus, the government
was not involved in the production of the public good and only had the role of
enforcing lump-sum taxes and transfers on households and firms. It was also
assumed that government made purchases from the firms at market prices. We
took this set of assumptions as describing a completely free market oriented pol-
icy benchmark applicable in principle to provision of any type of public good.
The model can also be seen as a descriptive one covering cases in which a public
institution purchases from private producers goods that will be consumed by
households involved as public goods. Examples include fluoride purchased by
a public agency to fluoridate a public water supply, pesticides purchased by
government, packages of medicine bought by an international charitable orga-
nization for use in an underdeveloped country to control an epidemic disease,
and so on.21
20Villanacci and Zenginobuz (2005b) analyze such a model.
21An interesting feature of the model analyzed in the paper is that it allows an answer to a
more general problem. Does including one more “market imperfection” in the presence of an
initial one make government intervention more or less eﬀective? It is well known that, under
certain assumptions, a well chosen local redistribution among all households in a model with
incomplete markets leads to a Pareto superior equilibrium (see the papers by Geanakoplos and
Polemarchakis (1986) and Citanna et al. (1998)). On the other hand, neutrality results to the
eﬀect that when all households are contributors no local redistribution aﬀects equilibria apply
to general equilibrium models with incomplete markets and public goods. These observations
suggest that a government intervention that would be eﬀective against a single imperfection
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One other issue that is widely considered in the private provision of public
good models is the crowding-out eﬀects. There is said to be a crowding-out
eﬀect if, when the government taxes household and uses collected taxes to in-
crease the amount of public good, households reduce their provision, partially
or completely, thereby oﬀsetting the intervention by the government to increase
the overall level of the public good. The results we have obtained so far can be
used to cover certain cases regarding crowding-out eﬀects. For the same reasons
presented in Section 3.1, if the planner taxes only the contributors (in lump-sum
amounts), crowding-out eﬀect will be total. If, in an equilibrium after the redis-
tribution, each contributing household h expects that in the new equilibrium (i)
all prices stay the same; (ii) level of production of private and public goods stay
the same; (iii) the government uses taxes to purchase public good at market
prices; and (iv) each other household h0 6= h changes her contribution by the
exact amount of the change in her wealth, then it will be optimal for household
h to change her contribution by the exact amount of the change in her own
wealth, leading to overall level of public good remaining the same as before the
taxation. On the other hand, in a similar manner to what was stated and shown
in Theorem 7 and Theorem 8, it can be proved that if taxes that the government
will use to purchase public goods are imposed jointly on non-contributors and
contributors, the total supply of public good may increase or decrease.
A final point to mention is about the welfare analysis of government in-
terventions that aim to alter equilibrium outcomes under private provision of
public goods. Most of the related literature analyzes the impact of government
intervention on the total level G of privately provided public good, which is
known to be (almost always) underprovided relative to the “eﬃcient” level.22
The underlying assumption behind that approach is that “welfare” will increase
through bringing G closer to the “eﬃcient” level. There are two problems with
such an indirect approach to welfare analysis in private public good provision
models. Firstly, the eﬃcient level of public good is generically not independent
of distribution of endowments, and hence an intervention that involves redistri-
bution of endowments will in general alter the “eﬃcient” level that the interven-
tion is aimed at. Secondly, if intervention involves taxing non-contributors (in
lump-sum amounts), then welfare analysis becomes more complicated as taxing
non-contributors to increase the public good level may decrease their welfare.
Therefore, a direct approach to welfare analysis will be needed to study inter-
ventions that has the goal of Pareto improving upon the market outcome. Our
techniques allow for such an exploration of types of government policies that
will achieve that aim.23
may turn out to be ineﬀective when another imperfection is present.
22An exception is a paper by Cornes and Sandler (2000), where they investigate, in a one
private good and one public good setting, the possibility for a government to increase all
households’ welfare via an increase in the total supply of the public good.
23Villanacci and Zenginobuz (2005c) provides an analysis of such policies.
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